At the Helm of the Multidisciplinary Practice Issue After the ABA\u27s Recommendation: States Finding Solutions by Taking Stock in European Harmonization to Preserve Their Sovereignty in Regulating the Legal Profession by Christensen, Robert K.
BYU Law Review
Volume 2001 | Issue 1 Article 7
3-1-2001
At the Helm of the Multidisciplinary Practice Issue
After the ABA's Recommendation: States Finding
Solutions by Taking Stock in European
Harmonization to Preserve Their Sovereignty in
Regulating the Legal Profession
Robert K. Christensen
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Legal Profession Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert K. Christensen, At the Helm of the Multidisciplinary Practice Issue After the ABA's Recommendation: States Finding Solutions by
Taking Stock in European Harmonization to Preserve Their Sovereignty in Regulating the Legal Profession, 2001 BYU L. Rev. 375 (2001).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2001/iss1/7
7CHR-FIN.DOC 2/22/01 11:00 PM 
 
375 
At the Helm of the Multidisciplinary Practice Issue 
After the ABA’s Recommendation: States Finding 
Solutions by Taking Stock in European 
Harmonization to Preserve Their Sovereignty in 
Regulating the Legal Profession 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“[A]n MDP [multidisciplinary practice] is an organization 
owned wholly or in part by non-lawyers which provides legal services 
directly to the public through owner or employee lawyers.”1 The is-
sues raised by the multidisciplinary practice of law are numerous and 
complex, and include international legal trends, economic pressures, 
consumer demands, the permanency of ethical codes, professional 
independence, and the scope of a state’s power to limit the legal pro-
fession. 
Possibly for these reasons, multidisciplinary practice has been 
deemed by many, including the president of the American Bar Asso-
ciation (the “ABA”), to be the most important problem facing the 
legal profession.2 Because the multidisciplinary practice of law has 
been functionally illegal in all fifty states,3 the decision of whether 
MDPs are ultimately accepted or rejected has been analogized to a 
crossroads,4 a cliff,5 and to the historical situations of overconfidence 
 
 1. Ward Bower, The Big Five’s Case for MDPs, 1999 A.B.A. SEC. L. PRAC. MGMT. 
ANN. MEETING 185 (noting also that “[i]n practice, MDPs also include otherwise independ-
ent law firms owned only by lawyers which practice in close cooperation with professional ser-
vice firms owned exclusively or partly by non-lawyers, usually under a contractual arrange-
ment”). 
 2. See American Bar Association Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, General 
Information Form (visited Oct. 30, 2000) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpgeninfo.html>; 
see also Richard Pena, Where Do We Go from Here?, 62 TEX. B.J. 328, 330 (1999). 
 3. See American Bar Association Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Back-
ground Paper on Multidisciplinary Practice: Issues and Developments (visited Oct. 30, 2000) 
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ multicomreport0199.html> [hereinafter Background Paper]. 
 4. Richard Pena, The State of the Profession, 62 TEX. B.J. 110, 110 (1999) (noting that 
“[t]he legal profession in this state and throughout the country is at a crossroads. We have the  
opportunity to chart the proper course for the future, and a real chance of being  
successful . . . .”). 
 5. See Pena, supra note 2, at 328. 
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resulting in loss of industry autonomy, where doctors suffered in the 
1990s, timberworkers in the 1980s, and automakers in the 1960s 
and 1970s.6 
Traditionally, the discussion of the multidisciplinary practice of 
law has included lawyers and accountants as central players. Un-
doubtedly, this is because the larger accounting firms have provided 
the resources that initially fueled the call for allowing MDPs. None-
theless, the proposal and issues discussed in this Comment are appli-
cable in nontraditional contexts—including alliances between lawyers 
and insurance agencies, lawyers and health care providers, and so 
forth. “The MDP movement is not limited to accounting and law 
firms”;7 nor is it confined to the United States.8 It is an international 
phenomenon. 
In fact, “[t]he International Bar Association appointed a stand-
ing committee to study MDPs in 1996, resulting in a September, 
1998 resolution recommending that regulators allow MDPs so long 
as client and public interests are adequately protected.”9 In 1998, the 
ABA appointed a special commission, the Commission on Multidis-
ciplinary Practice (the “Commission”), to investigate and report on 
the viability of the multidisciplinary practice of law in America.10 Be-
cause the regulation of professions is largely within states’ regulatory 
powers, some state and local bar associations have formed independ-
ent commissions on this issue. 
In August 1999, the American Bar Association’s Commission 
“recommended that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct be 
amended, subject to certain restrictions, to permit a lawyer to partner 
with a nonlawyer even if the activities of the enterprise consisted of 
 
 6. See id. (referring to Jennifer James and anthropologists who believe that how we 
address modern issues such as the multidisciplinary practice of law puts the legal profession in 
the same perilous position as past industries while they were losing occupational independ-
ence). 
 7. Talha A. Zobair, Point-Counterpoint—Multidisciplinary Practices—Firms of the Fu-
ture, 79 MICH. B.J. 64, 65 (2000) (referring to professional services such as expense manage-
ment, travel services, etc.); see also Paul Michael Hassett, Association Must Forge Consensus on 
Issues Important to Profession, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 26, 2000, at S3 (referring to other financial ser-
vices). 
 8. Although this Comment focuses on implementing MDPs in the United States, its 
reasoning is equally applicable to other states and nations dealing with the MDP issue. 
 9. Bower, supra note 1, at 186. 
 10. See American Bar Association Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Updated 
Background and Informational Report and Request for Comments (visited Oct. 30, 2000) 
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/febmdp.html>. 
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the practice of law and to share legal fees with a nonlawyer.”11 This 
recommendation was based on “more than sixty hours of public 
hearings, listening to the testimony of fifty-six witnesses, and receiv-
ing written comments from interested individuals and organiza-
tions . . . .”12 Much of the Commission’s research was based on the 
experiences of European countries that, to some extent, have allowed 
MDPs.13 Nonetheless, the ABA ignored the recommendation of its 
own MDP Commission, which it then disbanded, and recently de-
cided to maintain an anti-MDP policy.14 This appears to be an effort 
to uphold the “traditional” values of the legal profession, in an at-
mosphere where the Commission is no longer needed to explore 
MDP alternatives. 
By withdrawing national support from the exploration of MDP 
alternatives, the ABA has surrendered an important role in develop-
ing a meaningful approach to the multidisciplinary practice issue. 
Categorical rejection of MDPs is not a tenable solution, as evidenced 
by the many states unable to reconcile the ABA’s anti-MDP policy 
with all of the evidence suggesting that the time for MDPs has 
come.15 
One of the major underpinnings of this issue is the scope and in-
tensity of the regulations to which a regulating authority may subject 
the legal profession. Many have challenged the scope of “state su-
 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Background Paper, supra note 3. 
 14. See American Bar Association Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, MDP Rec-
ommendation to House (visited Oct. 30, 2000) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ mdpre-
com10F.html>; American Bar Association News Release, American Bar Association Rejects 
Sharing of Fees with Nonlawyers and Nonlawyer Ownership or Control of Entities that Practice 
Law (July 11, 2000) <http://www.abanet.org/media/jul00/hodrelease.html> (noting that 
“[t]he American Bar Association today voted to maintain its position that lawyers not be per-
mitted to share fees with nonlawyers . . . effectively rejecting the concept of multidisciplinary 
practice . . . .”); NYSSCPA, ABA Defeats MDP Proposal (visited Oct. 30, 2000) 
<http://www.nysscpa.org/home/ ABASaysNoToMDP.htm> (noting that “[t]he ABA vote 
goes against the recommendation of its own commission appointed to study the issue. . . . The 
commission was disbanded after the vote was made.”). 
 15. See American Bar Association Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Status of 
Multidisciplinary Practice Studies by State (and some local bars) (visited Oct. 30, 2000) 
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp-state_action.html> (noting that Arizona, as an advocate 
for MDPs, “[r]ecognize[s] that multidisciplinary practices already exist de facto in the United 
States . . . . [and that the] Bar and the Court must participate in the regulation of legal services 
delivered by lawyers in MDPs to assure that clients who receive those legal services receive the 
levels of professionalism and protection as clients of lawyers who are not in MDPs”). 
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premacy in the regulation of lawyers.”16 Some have suggested that 
states should substitute national regulations, e.g., codes of conduct, 
for their own.17 Such a substitution would be, in light of the ABA’s 
resolution, patently antagonistic towards MDPs and a step closer to a 
national policy barring the multidisciplinary practice of law. Natu-
rally, such a policy would not be accepted by the states that have 
adopted MDP-friendly policies and those states still exploring the is-
sue.18 
Unfortunately, the present landscape is devoid of solutions and 
full of controversy. There are currently no proposals that would fa-
cilitate a win-win situation for the advocates and antagonists of the 
multidisciplinary practice of law. However, this Comment suggests 
that by following the European MDP and harmonization experience 
countries and states facing controversies over the MDP issue can cre-
ate a successful compromise. Accordingly, this Comment does not 
demand that states yield the whole of their regulating authority to a 
national/international entity—regardless of whether that body has 
accepted MDPs. On the contrary, the author believes it important 
for states to retain their authority to regulate. Even if states ulti-
mately want to reserve their right to regulate the legal profession, 
this Comment suggests that there is a “range” in which states should 
exercise their regulatory power. Although states may retain caution 
and prudence toward MDPs, state regulating authorities must be 
willing to work under an objective that does not absolutely discount 
the concept of the multidisciplinary practice of law. 
Part II of this Comment paints the backdrop for the MDP issue 
by discussing the viewpoints of the institutions that regulate the legal 
profession and their reasons for disfavoring MDPs. This part also 
 
 16. Anthony E. Davis, Profession Without a Compass: The Drift to Multidisciplinary Prac-
tice, 1999 A.B.A. SEC. L. PRAC. MGMT. ANN. MEETING 224, 226. 
 17. See id. (“For some time there has been under discussion in the Standing Committee 
on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the U.S. Judicial Conference . . . a proposal that would 
create and enact a set of Federal Rules of Ethics, to sit alongside the Federal Rules of Proce-
dure and Evidence.”); Anthony E. Davis, Poles Apart—New Developments in Unauthorized 
Practice of Law and Multidisciplinary Practice, 1999 A.B.A. SEC. L. PRAC. MGMT. ANN. 
MEETING 232, 237 (noting that “it cannot be clearer that the time has come to replace the 
state-by-state regulation of lawyers”). 
 18. See American Bar Association Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report 
from the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (visited Oct. 30, 2000) <http:// 
www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpstats.html> (reporting that 23 states have set up committees but 
have not returned reports, and three states have taken positive action on pro change reports) 
[hereinafter Report from the ABA Commission]. 
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notes that, in addition to direct experiences with MDPs, the Euro-
pean Community has developed principles of harmonization that can 
be applied to solve the multidisciplinary practice of law controversy.19 
Part III focuses on the multidisciplinary practice of law in Europe 
and highlights the utility of the European Community’s principles of 
harmonization as they relate to MDPs. Relying on “new approach 
harmonization,” Part IV charts a suggested course for the future, 
wherein the regulators of the legal profession can feasibly allow the 
multidisciplinary practice of law in their own jurisdictions. Part V 
concludes by emphasizing the need to create a mutually beneficial 
situation for parties that currently appear to be deadlocked on the 
MDP issue. 
II. HESITANCY TO ADOPT THE ABA COMMISSION ON 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE’S RECOMMENDATION 
The multidisciplinary practice of law faces many obstacles before 
it finds broad acceptance. Among the most formidable are the insti-
tutions that regulate the practice of law. Generally, these are the na-
tional, state, and local bar associations. As evidenced by the ABA’s 
recent rejection of MDPs,20 these regulatory bodies have predomi-
nantly responded to multidisciplinary practice with either outright 
rejection, measured skepticism, or silence.21 
A second, related obstacle is found in various Codes of Ethical 
Conduct. Of particular importance is Rule 5.4 (or its state/local 
equivalent), which prohibits lawyers from forming partnerships with 
non-lawyers in providing professional services—the functional 
equivalent of banning MDPs. 
 
 19. See, e.g., David Rubenstein, Accounting Firm Legal Practices Expand Rapidly; How 
the Big Six Firms Are Practicing Law in Europe; Europe First, Then the World?, CORP. LEGAL 
TIMES, Nov. 1997, at 1 (“A look at what the accounting firms are doing in Europe will give 
some idea of what form, or forms, an accounting firm offensive might take here. The expan-
sion into European law practice is happening in one of two ways. The first is by the establish-
ment of an ‘in-house’ practice: that is, by bringing lawyers into the accounting firm itself.”); 
Report of the Orange County Bar Association Task Force on Multidisciplinary Practice (visited 
Oct. 30, 2000) <http://www.ocbar.org/multidis.html> (illustrating that the European ex-
perience is vital to how bars approach this issue). 
 20. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 21. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
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A. How State Bars Are Approaching Pro-MDP Recommendations 
1. A landscape filled with resistance 
On the international level, “[i]n 1996, the Council of the Bars 
and Law Societies of the European Union (CCBE) adopted a posi-
tion strongly opposed to multidisciplinary partnerships between law-
yers and nonlawyers.”22 In the face of pro-MDP recommendations 
from the International Bar Association and the American Bar Asso-
ciation’s former Commission, bar associations appear to be hesitant, 
even resistant, to allow the multidisciplinary practice of law.23 
On the state and local level, a handful of state bars, and con-
ceivably many local bars, have not yet formed commissions to inform 
themselves of the issues surrounding MDPs.24 Those bars that have 
formed commissions to study the issues are generally hesitant to 
adopt or draw any conclusions from their research and recommenda-
tions.25 
a. Illustrating the resistance. The Orange County Bar Association 
responded to the recommendation of the American Bar Association’s 
Commission as follows. Their response illustrates much of the hesi-
tancy that is associated with the MDP issue: 
The [Orange County] Task Force is unable to reach a concrete 
conclusion of a thumbs up or thumbs down on the Commission’s 
recommendation and MDPs . . . . The [Orange County Bar Asso-
ciation] could consider focusing on a strong recommendation to 
the California State Bar to remain independent and not allow 
MDPs until questions and issues can be adequately addressed. Let 
some other jurisdiction undertake the risks associated with MDP for-
mation and be the guinea pig. The consumers of legal services in 
 
 22. See Background Paper, supra note 3 (noting, however, that “[a] proposal to soften 
that position received a majority of votes cast at the November 1998 plenary session of the 
CCBE. But it failed to carry since it did not meet a supermajority requirement”). 
 23. See Report from the ABA Commission, supra note 18 (“Twenty-three states have ap-
pointed committees but the committees have not yet returned reports . . . . Ten states have 
appointed committees that have returned reports but have taken no action on the reports. . . . 
Nine states have taken action against change at the Board or House level . . . . Four states have 
not appointed committees.”). 
 24. See Background Paper, supra note 3 (noting, however, that “[a] proposal to soften 
that position received a majority of votes cast at the November 1998 plenary session of the 
CCBE. But it failed to carry since it did not meet a supermajority requirement”). 
 25. See id. 
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California and the attorneys here will benefit from that approach in 
the long run. 26 
The Orange County Bar Association is not alone in its inimical 
stance on MDPs. The New York State Bar Association, a powerful 
voice in the ear of the ABA’s House of Delegates, recently an-
nounced its own 
opposition to “any changes in existing regulations prohibiting at-
torneys from practicing law in MDPs, in the absence of a sufficient 
demonstration that such changes are in the best interests of clients 
and society and do not undermine or dilute the integrity of the de-
livery of legal services by the legal profession.”27 
After hearing the recommendation of the Commission, “[t]he Il-
linois State Bar Association has asked the ABA to postpone any ac-
tion pending further study.”28 Minnesota, another vocal player in 
this debate, has expressed the desire to “take [its] time before con-
sidering what course of action benefits [its] clients, protects the pub-
lic, and best serves [the] profession.”29 
b. The early bird may get the worm. To date, three states have 
adopted pro-MDP policies.30 Although the Michigan Bar has not 
chosen to adopt the work of its MDP committee, it has commented 
on the advantages of articulating a timely and favorable position on 
MDPs. In its approach, Michigan champions its own sovereign pow-
ers to regulate. “The State Bar of Michigan . . . has the opportunity 
to take the lead by establishing a sound regulatory framework for 
MDPs in Michigan.”31 This reasoning is encouraging and illustrates 
the ultimate conclusion of this paper: 
By embracing MDPs, the State Bar of Michigan can allow Michi-
gan attorneys to expand their services to accommodate the chang-
ing market climate. It can take the lead in addressing the need to 
 
 26. Report of the Orange County Bar Association Task Force on Multidisciplinary Prac-
tice, supra note 19 (emphasis added). 
 27. Edward J. Cleary, Multidisciplinary Practice & Professional Independence, BENCH & 
B. OF MINN. (visited Oct. 31, 1999) <http://www2.mnbar.org/benchandbar/1999/sep99/ 
mdp_prof-resp.htm> (quoting New York State Bar Association). 
 28. Elizabeth Neff, No Bane in Non-Lawyer Ties: Poll, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Jan. 3, 
2000, at 1. 
 29. Cleary, supra note 27. 
 30. See Report from the ABA Commission, supra note 18 (noting Arizona, Colorado, and 
Minnesota as pro-MDP states). 
 31. Zobair, supra note 7, at 66. 
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regulate MDPs by leading the dialogue. In doing this, Michigan at-
torneys would be positioned to be the leaders in the professional 
services business by showing that we can readily adapt to change 
and that we can help our clients do the same. 
 This flexibility would also allow Michigan to prosper in a chang-
ing global business environment. Furthermore, other Michigan 
professional services firms will have similar gains with an increase in 
market share through the expansion of service offerings. Traditional 
nonlawyer firms will be forced to exchange some professional 
autonomy for market share. Likewise, Michigan lawyers will have to 
do the same to become the premier local and global service provid-
ers in the new millennium.32 
2. Balancing the considerations in regulating the legal profession 
Undoubtedly, at least in the United States, regulating the legal 
profession has traditionally been the prerogative of the individual 
state and local bar associations. Currently, states, not the federal 
government, are granted the power to regulate the legal profession.33 
Many bar associations are legitimately concerned that ethical conduct 
may not be properly controlled if the regulation of MDPs is turned 
over to the free market. Bar associations thus play an important role 
in policing the ethical conduct of attorneys. 
As with any regulating authority, it is important to periodically 
examine the regulator’s role to ensure that those being regulated, as 
well as the public, are well served by the efforts. Inquiries must be 
made into whether the authority is fulfilling or overplaying its role. 
Similar questions apply to those being regulated. Thus, whether 
outdated regulations allow abuses or inefficiencies should be exam-
ined. 
The advent of MDPs calls for such an examination of the regula-
tion of the legal profession. Although the bars’ concerns on this issue 
deserve merit, well-researched reports that ultimately support a pro-
MDP approach (as was suggested by the research of the ABA’s for-
mer MDP Commission and the International Bar Association) sug-
gest that it is time to review the regulating relationship. In other 
words, the recent developments and scholarship on MDPs may re-
 
 32. Id. 
 33. See Bower, supra note 1, at 187. 
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solve many of the bars’ concerns, which once justified the strict regu-
lation of the legal profession on this issue, eventually opening the 
way for MDPs. 
On the one hand, no regulating institution would condone a 
movement that may result in the unethical practice of law—especially 
when that institution is concerned with ensuring the propriety of the 
legal profession in its jurisdiction. However, the Commission’s rec-
ommendation, supported by the work of modern scholars, strongly 
suggests that such concerns have been addressed.34 Furthermore, if 
the commentators are correct in analogizing the advent of MDPs to 
that of HMOs in the medical profession—usurping some of the doc-
tors’ autonomy because of their failure to change with the times35— 
the balance again seems to tip in favor of considering pro-MDP poli-
cies. 
Indeed, evidence from abroad suggests that current regulations 
are not really protecting the public but are insulating law firms from 
the international business market.36 A recent “poll conducted on be-
half of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the American Corporate 
Counsel Association has found 70 percent of Americans favor allow-
ing multi-disciplinary practice.”37 Steve Bokat, executive vice presi-
dent of the National Chamber Litigation Center of the U.S. Cham-
ber of Commerce, stated, “‘The majority of the people in this 
country are resistant to what they see as unnecessary regulation and 
feel they are smart enough to make decisions about who can best ful-
fill their needs. . . . People want to have options of where they get  
 
 34. See generally American Bar Association Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, 
Report, Appendices, and Recommendation, 1999 A.B.A. SEC. L. PRAC. MGMT. ANN. MEETING 
191. The report states, “In reaching these conclusions, the Commission considered the history 
of and reasons for the prohibition against the sharing of legal fees and forming of partnerships 
or other entities with nonlawyers.” Id. at 192. 
For a sampling of scholarly works addressing and resolving the concerns of MDPs, see Ronald 
A. Landen, Comment, The Prospects of the Accountant-Lawyer Multidisciplinary Partnership in 
English-Speaking Countries, 13 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 763 (1999); Gianluca Morello, Note, 
Big Six Accounting Firms Shop World Wide for Law Firms: Why Multi-Disciplinary Practices 
Should Be Permitted in the United States, 21 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 190 (1997). 
 35. See Pena, supra note 4, at 110 (noting that “[a]nthropologists such as Jennifer 
James warn that the legal profession could very well be where the medical profession was 10 
years ago. The medical profession would not accept that a new medical paradigm was unfold-
ing and because doctors waited, the medical profession lost all power.”). 
 36. See Sheryl Stratton, Multidisciplinary Practice Issues in the U.S. and Abroad, TAX 
NOTES INT’L, Jan. 11, 1999, at 156, 157. 
 37. Neff, supra note 28, at 1. 
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their services.’”38 As we become a more service-oriented society, Mr. 
Bokat’s observation warrants careful consideration.39 
In light of evidence indicating that “[c]lients . . . are demand-
ing—and getting—legal advice from ‘one-stop shopping’ profes-
sional service providers,”40 bars should intently examine their role as 
regulators and verify whom they are protecting and if that protection 
is enhanced by unhurried or resistant acceptance of MDPs. If bar as-
sociations focus on the consumers of legal services, they are less likely 
to substitute their own concerns for the desires and economic benefit 
of the consumers.41 If the bar is concerned with the welfare of the 
legal profession, then it needs to realize that prohibiting lawyers 
from competing in the international marketplace, where many MDPs 
are already thriving, may be detrimental to the economic relationship 
between lawyers and consumers. In this light, regulations disallowing 
MDPs may well be considered without sufficient basis and driven by 
little more than political jockeying, the fears of naysayers, and the 
discomfort inherent in change.42 
Regulators must not be allowed to discount the call for change 
simply because there are consumer or economic elements motivating 
the movement. In our consumer-driven economy, it is not unusual 
for regulations to reflect consumer interests.43 
[L]egal rules and constructs are increasingly relying on such non-
law factors such as economics, quantitative studies, etc. For exam-
ple, our own Internal Revenue Service employs economists to de-
termine whether transactions have economic substance and to de-
velop safe harbor rules for taxpayers. If the IRS employs economists 
to establish legal norms, taxpayers must similarly employ such non-
 
 38. Id. 
 39. See, e.g., David A. Swankin, Written Testimony of David A. Swankin: President, Citi-
zen Advocacy Center, 1999 A.B.A. SEC. L. PRAC. MGMT. ANN. MEETING 247 (giving a de-
tailed discussion of the advantages that consumers would enjoy in a pro-MDP environment 
and addressing many of the bars’ concerns). 
 40. Stratton, supra note 36, at 158 (emphasis added). 
 41. See generally Zobair, supra note 7. Zobair states, “MDPs have become the practical 
solution to obtaining cost-effective, comprehensive, professional services in an increasingly de-
regulated global market.” Id. at 64. 
 42. See generally Oral Remarks of Charles F. Robinson, Solo Practitioner, Clearwater, 
Florida, 1999 A.B.A. SEC. L. PRAC. MGMT. ANN. MEETING 274. 
 43. See Stefan F. Tucker, Written Remarks of Stefan F. Tucker Submitted to the Commis-
sion on Multidisciplinary Practice, 1999 A.B.A. SEC. L. PRAC. MGMT. ANN. MEETING 280, 
286 (“Law firms and multidisciplinary practices are, by virtue of today’s litigious world, truly 
regulated by external forces—client and customer demands and expectations.”). 
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law professionals to inform their legal advice. Thus, a tax practice 
that properly informed its clients on the safe harbor should include 
the delivery of services from an economist to ensure that the client 
receives the highest quality representation.44 
Many interested parties believe that “the existing regulatory frame-
work is broken, and needs fixing.”45 Although regulators may view 
economic and consumer demands as too revolutionary a basis to 
warrant change to the regulatory framework, failure to do so is an 
oversight rooted in antiquated thinking. 
B. Model Rules of Conduct 
Current rules of professional conduct, generally Model Rule of 
Professional Conduct 5.4, or its state/local equivalent, functionally 
prohibit MDPs by disallowing lawyers to form partnerships with 
nonlawyers in the provision of legal services. Like many of the atti-
tudes of the bar associations, the rules of conduct would need to be 
altered before MDPs could become widely established in the United 
States. 
The ABA Commission, in recommending that MDPs be allowed 
in the United States, proffers thoughtful suggestions of how the 
rules should be modified—allowing increased occupational freedom 
without sewing the seeds of unbridled anarchy, which many believe 
will ensue should the rules be changed. The following selections 
highlight these modifications: 
1. The legal profession should adopt and maintain rules of profes-
sional conduct that protect its core values, independence of profes-
sional judgment, protection of confidential client information, and 
loyalty to the client through avoidance of conflicts of interest, but 
should not permit existing rules to unnecessarily inhibit the devel-
opment of new structures for the more effective delivery of services 




 44. John Dzienkowski, Statement of Professor John Dzienkowski, University of Texas 
School of Law to ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, 1999 A.B.A. SEC. L. PRAC. 
MGMT. ANN. MEETING 298, 314. 
 45. Tucker, supra note 43, at 286 (giving a detailed discussion of the advantages that 
consumers would enjoy in a pro-MDP environment and addressing many of the concerns of 
bars). 
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2. A lawyer should be permitted to share legal fees with a 
nonlawyer, subject to certain safeguards that prevent erosion of the 
core values of the legal profession. 
3. A lawyer should be permitted to deliver legal services through a 
multidisciplinary practice (MDP), defined as a partnership, profes-
sional corporation, or other association or entity that includes law-
yers and nonlawyers and has as one, but not all, of its purposes the 
delivery of legal services to a client(s) other than the MDP itself or 
that holds itself out to the public as providing nonlegal, as well as 
legal, services. It includes an arrangement by which a law firm joins 
with one or more other professional firms to provide services, in-
cluding legal services, and there is a direct or indirect sharing of 
profits as part of the arrangement. 
. . . 
5. A lawyer in an MDP who delivers legal services to the MDP’s 
clients should be bound by the rules of professional conduct. 
6. A lawyer acting in accordance with a nonlawyer supervisor’s 
resolution of a question of professional duty should not thereby be 
excused from failing to observe the rules of professional conduct. 
7. All rules of professional conduct that apply to a law firm should 
also apply to an MDP.46 
Some regulators of the legal profession have been quick to point 
out that the ABA Commission’s modifications do not exhaustively 
address every concern and should thus be discarded. “The Report’s 
lack of clarity and guidance caused [the Orange County Bar Associa-
tion] to raise questions instead of reaching any recommendations or 
conclusions . . . . [T]he Commission . . . should have provided . . . a 
clearer definition of a MDP . . . and better thought to client confi-
dentiality and conflicts of interest . . . .”47 Although these criticisms 
may reflect some truth, the Commission’s recommendation to mod-
ify the rules should prevail for at least three reasons. 
 
 
 46. American Bar Association Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to the 
House of Delegates (visited Oct. 31, 2000) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdprecommend-
tion.html> (omitting several of the other modifications). 
 47. Report of the Orange County Bar Association Task Force on Multidisciplinary Prac-
tice, supra note 19. 
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First, unless state bars wish to nationalize the regulation of the 
legal profession, it is not the burden of the ABA Commission to ex-
haust and address every conceivable nuance associated with MDPs. 
As with other issues of legal professional conduct, such is the pre-
rogative of the individual bar associations. The ABA Commission has 
fulfilled its mission of determining whether safeguards can be devel-
oped to allow the ethical multidisciplinary practice of law. After in-
vesting the time and resources necessary, its conclusion is that allow-
ing MDPs is possible and necessary. Their work is complete even if it 
is not exhaustive. Figuratively speaking, the ball now lies in the court 
of the entities and associations acting as custodians for the legal pro-
fession to respond to the research and findings of the ABA. If the 
state and local bar associations are going to continue to regulate the 
legal profession, they should recognize their obligation to decide is-
sues such as MDPs before it is too late. Accordingly, 
[t]he Commission recognizes that new procedures must be devel-
oped to regulate the delivery of legal services through MDPs. This 
does not mean that a new regulatory body must be established or 
that regulation must be done on a national level. The Commis-
sion’s recommendations provide for continued regulation of the 
delivery of legal services by the highest court of each jurisdiction, 
regardless of the organizational structure in which a lawyer prac-
tices.48 
Second, bar associations should not unduly adhere to Rule 5.4 as 
canon. Rules such as 5.4 reflect the ebb and flow of needs in the le-
gal profession and are not among those rules that spring forth from 
the foundations of ethical conduct. In studying the foundation of 
Rule 5.4, the Commission found that: 
The existing bans found in Model Rule 5.4 were not contained in 
the original Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the ABA in 
1908. It was not until twenty years later that the ABA added Can-
ons 33 through 35, Model Rule 5.4’s predecessors. The Canons, 




 48. American Bar Association Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report, 1999 
A.B.A. SEC. L. PRAC. MGMT. ANN. MEETING 191, 196. 
 49. Id. at 192. 
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Sentiments that would canonize Rule 5.4 institutionalize the 
regulation of the legal practice regardless of the harm or benefit and 
do not allow regulating entities to be true custodians. Possibly the 
best evidence of the metamorphic nature of Rule 5.4 is found in the 
District of Columbia’s recent modification, which does not allow 
MDPs but does “permit partnership and fee sharing with 
nonlawyers.”50 The Commission’s report also points out that this is 
not the first time that Rule 5.4 has been targeted by proposals of re-
laxation.51 
Third, failure to reexamine Rule 5.4 will perpetuate a harm to 
lawyers and consumers of legal services, which will increase as the 
market becomes more global and the competition becomes more in-
ternational. These dynamics are apparent in the following observa-
tions. 
The Big Six [now five] firms have the advantage of seemingly 
boundless resources. They generate several billions of dollars in 
revenue and have greater resources for marketing and specializa-
tion, observed an attorney. Law firms, by comparison, “are over-
matched,” . . . . They lack the capital base and financial resources to 
compete with the Big Six, and they can’t afford to have the man-
agement structure . . . . 
Even if law firms could afford it, ethical rules prevent them from 
expanding their business . . . “lawyers are in a very regulated pro-
fession . . . . It’s a hideously rigorous stricture . . . as are the Model 
Rules [of Professional Conduct] for conflicts of interest.” 
“A double standard exists . . . . Law firms are not permitted to un-
dertake steps that accounting firms are enabled to do.” Attorneys 
can’t charge clients directly for services provided by the law firm’s 
accountants, “yet accounting firms employ attorneys and charge 
clients for the services of the attorneys.”52 
These are not singular observations. “Traditional law firms are 
finding themselves in a competitive disadvantage. Witness . . . the ti-
 
 50. Background Paper, supra note 3. 
 51. See id. (citing ELAINE REICH, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES 
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 159–64 
(1987)). 
 52. Sheryl Stratton, Practice of Law by CPA Firm Members Raises Legal and Ethical 
Questions, TAX NOTES TODAY, Apr. 25, 1997, at 80–86. 
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tle of a recent article in the American Bar Association Journal on this 
subject: ‘Squeeze: As Accountants Edge into the Legal Market, Lawyers 
May Find Themselves Blindsided by the Assault But Also Limited by 
Professional Rules.’”53 
In this light, some law firms are finding ways to meet market 
demands by working around Rule 5.4. Under the current MDP pro-
hibitions, “some law firms have established separate ancillary busi-
nesses in which lawyers and nonlawyer partners provide professional 
services to clients . . . . [I]f the ban on partnerships with 
nonlawyers . . . [were] modified, some of these law firms would in-
corporate the ancillary businesses directly into their practices, naming 
the nonlawyers as partners.”54 But, as long as the ban is in place, 
working around Rule 5.4 also incurs disapproval and is not a viable 
solution for a stable future in the legal profession—especially with 
many regulators and practitioners at loggerheads. For example, the 
Pennsylvania Bar notes, “[d]e facto MDPs are everywhere around us 
and the ‘civil disobedience’ of more than 5,000 of our lawyer breth-
ren in the accounting firms and elsewhere as yet goes unchecked and 
unchallenged.”55 
These sentiments buttress the findings of the Commission: there 
are strong arguments suggesting that the time has come to modify 
Rule 5.4 to reflect the needs of the consumers and producers of the 
legal services. 
Market forces and the structure set forth by the Commission 
suggest that ethical conduct can still be maintained, and consumers 
protected, under the multidisciplinary practice of law. Thus, it is time 
to reexamine the justification for regulations prohibiting MDPs and 
realize that what may have once been legitimate is now arbitrary, no 
longer justifying current forms of regulatory intervention. 
The present circumstances suggest that the regulations do not 
justify the end. A state’s regulatory power must have limits. 
 
 
 53. Ronald D. Rotunda, Multidisciplinary Practice: An Idea Whose Time Has Come (vis-
ited Oct. 31, 2000) <http://www.fed-soc.org/multidisciplinaryprofv3i2.htm> (citing John 
Gibeaut, Squeeze: As Accountants Edge into the Legal Market, Lawyers May Find Themselves 
Blindsided by the Assault But Also Limited by Professional Rules, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1998, at 42). 
 54. Background Paper, supra note 3 (footnote omitted). 
 55. Pennsylvania Bar Association Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice and Related 
Trends Affecting the Profession, Preliminary Report to 1999 Mid-Year Meeting of PBA House 
of Delegates (visited Oct. 31, 2000) <http://www.pabar.org/mdp915rp.shtml>. 
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[Without limits] the Fourteenth Amendment would have no effi-
cacy and the legislatures of the States would have unbounded 
power, and it would be enough to say that any piece of legislation 
was enacted to conserve the morals, the health or the safety of the 
people; such legislation would be valid, no matter how absolutely 
without foundation the claim might be. The claim of the police 
power would be a mere pretext—become another and delusive 
name for the supreme sovereignty of the State to be exercised free 
from constitutional restraint.56 
Some may question whether this issue falls more directly in the 
lap of Holden v. Hardy,57 where state regulations limiting the hours 
of miners was upheld as a legitimate means of protecting the health 
and safety of the miners, a “valid exercise of the police power of the 
State.”58 However, the MPD issue is easily distinguishable. In Hol-
den, without the state’s interference, the miners would have been left 
without protection against poor work conditions. 
[T]he proprietors of these [mining] establishments and their opera-
tives do not stand upon an equality, and that their interests are, to a 
certain extent, conflicting. The former naturally desire to obtain as 
much labor as possible from their employees, while the latter are 
often induced by the fear of discharge to conform to regulations 
which their judgment, fairly exercised, would pronounce to be det-
rimental to their health or strength. In other words, the proprietors 
lay down the rules and the laborers are practically constrained to 
obey them. In such cases self-interest is often an unsafe guide, and 
the legislature may properly interpose its authority.59 
Evidence shows that MDPs do not create such inequalities. In 
other words, the harms of MDPs, which regulating authorities seek 
to circumvent, do not exist in the same way as they did in Holden.60 
By way of illustration, modern consumers of legal services are more 
sophisticated, and, based on their sophistication, they can choose a 
traditional or multidisciplinary practice of law. By choosing a tradi-




 56. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905); see also discussion infra Part IV.B.3. 
 57. 169 U.S. 366 (1898). 
 58. Id. at 398. 
 59. Id. at 397. 
 60. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
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Undoubtedly, this issue is a very delicate one, requiring a balance 
between protecting the providers and consumers of legal services 
with international trends and a consumer-wide consensus demanding 
MDPs. Fortunately this is not an issue of first impression. Europe’s 
long-time association with MDPs provides numerous examples of so-
lutions that, by analogy, could help the United States and other 
countries to successfully incorporate the multidisciplinary practice of 
law. 
III. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY SETS THE STAGE FOR PROFESSIONAL 
GLOBALIZATION 
As previously discussed, domestic bar associations addressing 
multidisciplinary practice have expressed hesitancy and even resis-
tance in charting their jurisdiction’s relationship to the issue. It is 
understandable that the associations may feel that they are being 
asked to forge ahead at full throttle in uncharted waters. Perhaps for 
these reasons the ABA’s Commission collected data from entities 
who have already had experience with the MDP issue, such as many 
of the European states. 
Presumably, most state bar associations do not have, at least to 
the extent of the ABA’s Commission, the resources to conduct an 
independent study of the European experience with MDPs. How-
ever, the extensive research of the Commission, combined with the 
observations of several prominent scholars, provide an excellent 
foundation for domestic entities to begin assimilating Europe’s ex-
perience in solving this problem. Accordingly, the author has high-
lighted some of the data in Section A. 
Nonetheless, simply observing how a handful of European states 
have addressed the MDP issue has limited utility in solving the ulti-
mate problem of formulating a profession-wide approach to this is-
sue. After all, even the European Community continues to grapple 
with building a consensus across their jurisdictions.61 
The real utility of the European experience is discussed in Sec-
tion B. Principles of harmonization, which have evolved in the 
European Community, are sufficiently developed to be useful to the 
resolution of this issue. 
 
 61. See infra Part III.A. 
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A. European States and MDPs 
Although domestic bar associations may feel that they are being 
asked to resolve an issue with no precedence or prior application, 
such is not the case. State bar associations can look to Europe, as 
well as other nations, for a wealth of knowledge on the implications 
of MDPs. Indeed, MDPs have a long history in Europe. “MDPs 
originated in Germany, where, since the end of World War II, law-
yers have been able to practice in partnership with tax account-
ants . . . . [and] [i]n the past decade, the MDP movement has spread 
throughout Europe.”62 
Because Europe is a few steps ahead of the United States on this 
issue, a look at Europe’s recent history may serve as a template for 
the United States’ future resolution of the MDP issue. Europe’s his-
tory shows that, like the United States, there were, and in select cases 
still are, voices disfavoring MDPs. However, the voices opposing 
MDPs in Europe are slowly succumbing to international and Com-
munity trends. For example, “In 1996, the Council of the Bars and 
Law Societies of the European Union (CCBE) adopted a position 
strongly opposed to multidisciplinary partnerships between lawyers 
and nonlawyers . . . [but a] proposal to soften that position received 
a majority of votes cast at the November 1998 plenary ses-
sion . . . .”63 
Naturally, there is a range of acceptance of MDPs across Europe. 
“The positions . . . range from the liberal allowance of such ar-
rangements in Germany, to France, where lawyers practicing in firms 
owned by non-lawyers are asked only to swear to an affidavit averring 
 
 62. Bower, supra note 1, at 185. By way of illustration: 
The American Lawyer reported in November 1998 that PricewaterhouseCoopers 
employed 1,663 nontax lawyers in 39 countries; Arthur Andersen, 1,500 in 27 
countries; KPMG, 988 in an unidentified number of countries; Ernst & Young, 851 
in 32 countries; and Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, 586 in 14 countries. When com-
pared to the largest law firms, these figures placed PricewaterhouseCoopers and Ar-
thur Andersen third and fourth, respectively, in total number of lawyers employed 
worldwide, behind only Baker & McKenzie and Clifford Chance. The accounting 
firms are actively pursuing clients in markets as diverse as those of France, Spain, 
Australia, Canada, and the Confederation of the Independent States of the former 
Soviet Union. 
Background Paper, supra note 3 (footnotes omitted). 
 63. Id. (footnote omitted) (noting however that a supermajority was required to pass 
the vote). 
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their professional independence.”64 Notwithstanding the exceptions, 
the main thrust behind the trend toward universal European accep-
tance of MDPs appears to be twofold. First, as will be discussed 
more thoroughly in Part IV, international market forces and con-
sumer trends demand the liberalization of regulations on lawyers—
allowing them to expand their practice to fit today’s market. Second,  
at least in the European Community, Community principles of com-
petition demand the deregulation of the legal profession. 
1. International market and consumer trends 
Several European states that have opposed MDPs are now re-
tooling their positions. For example, in recent years “[i]n the UK, 
[MDPs were] banned outright, legislatively, but ‘independent’ law 
firms [could] practice in close cooperation with Big Five firms under 
a contractual arrangement for management services, holding them-
selves out as a part of the worldwide legal network of the appropriate 
Big Five firm.”65 
The United Kingdom has recently recognized that there are 
other forces at play, which demand the deregulation of the legal pro-
fession if the profession is to remain competitive. The year “1999 
ended with the Law Society council voting overwhelmingly in favour 
of mixed partnerships. The council recognised that the implementa-
tion of full MDPs will take time and considerable legislation but has 
agreed to work toward allowing solicitors to provide any legal service 
through any medium to anyone.”66 
The contrast between the U.K. and the U.S. approach 
could not [be] starker. On the one hand, the Mother of all com-
mon law courts, the House of Lords, is acknowledging the funda-
mental change that has already occurred in Europe—that what is at 
issue in cases involving the regulation of professional ethics is not 
to be determined by reference to who is providing the service—or 
by the particular qualifications of the provider—but rather that 
what is central is the nature of the service itself. By extension, the 
House of Lords is undercutting the arguments voiced in the US by 
die-hards clinging to the old ways, who assert that only lawyers, 
 
 64. Bower, supra note 1, at 186. 
 65. Id. at 187. 
 66. Abigail Townsend, Defiance or Alliance?, THE LAW., Jan. 10, 2000, at 16 (citing 
THE LAW., Oct. 18, 1999). 
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with their higher standards of professional responsibility, can be 
trusted to put their clients’ interests first, by establishing the princi-
ple that indeed the clients’ interests must be protected—by apply-
ing those standards to whoever supplies the services.67 
In analyzing the motivation behind the United Kingdom’s deci-
sion, one commentator stated that “[m]ost believe the move . . . is 
inevitable because of economic and political pressures. But expo-
nents of the practice say the biggest push will come from the clients 
who, in an increasingly global market, want a one-stop shop for legal 
and financial services that they can use anywhere in the world.”68 
Furthermore, there are the arguments that “those who retain multid-
isciplinary firms ‘will be sophisticated clients who have chosen a law-
yer associated with an accountancy firm for the benefits they believe 
will flow from that relationship . . . . [and] are able to distinguish 
when it would be in their interests to seek “arm’s length” independ-
ent legal advice.’” 69 
2. Community competition 
The European Court of Justice appears to be active in this debate 
and laying the foundation for lawyers to be able to compete in the 
international market by practicing law in a multidisciplinary setting. 
In the face of state sovereignty, the judicial activity seems to be war-
ranted as a means of preserving established fundamental rights cre-
ated by the European Union. Among these rights are freedom of 
profession, freedom of trade, freedom of industry, and, most signifi-
cantly, freedom of competition.70 A recent dispute in the Nether-
lands illustrates how MDPs intersect with these fundamental rights. 
In the Netherlands, where MDPs likewise are banned, two of the 
Big Five firms sued the Law Society seeking a judicial determina-
tion that the ban against MDPs violated competition laws. The 
Trial Court of Amsterdam upheld the ban, but that decision has 
been appealed to the European Court as inconsistent with the new 
 
 67. Davis, supra note 17, at 236. Although the contrast is actually between the U.K. 
and New Jersey, the comparison is intuitively applicable to the United States as a whole. 
 68. Townsend, supra note 66, at 16. 
 69. Bruce Balestier, Under One Roof: ABA Faces Arrival of Lawyer-Accountant Pairings, 
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 19, 1998, at 5 (quoting Alison Crawley of the Law Society of England and 
Wales). 
 70. See Respect for Fundamental Rights in the Union (visited Oct. 31, 2000) 
<http://www.europarl.eu.int/dg4/factsheets/en/ 2_1_0.htm>. 
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competition laws of the European Union. Reportedly negotiation be-
tween those Big Five firms and the Law Society could result in a 
compromise position, probably similar to that which has emerged 
de facto in the UK (“independent” law firms, contractually associ-
ated with Big Five firms).71 
The writing on the wall is that MDPs will be universally accept-
able, at least on a Community level, in order to facilitate the new 
structure of the European Union’s fundamental rights. However, re-
alistically, the Netherlands’ example is not likely to be the end of le-
gal cases on the subject.72 
In this light, the question, applicable both to the United States 
and the European Union, becomes how to reconcile the sovereign 
powers of states and nations to regulate professions with overarching 
considerations such as Community fundamental rights and interna-
tional market forces. 
B. Old and New Approaches to Harmonization: Invaluable Tools in 
Addressing MDPs 
Harmonization is exactly what the word implies: reconciling dif-
ferences to achieve a common objective. Applied to the MDP issue, 
the goal of harmonization would be to reconcile the sovereign pow-
ers of the legal profession’s regulators, and even the noncontrolling 
naysaying of the ABA, with the evidence that suggests the time has 
come to allow MDPs. Domestically and abroad, the author envisions 
the goal in implementing MDPs as the establishment of a common 
“legal services” market and the ultimate establishment of free com-
petition. 
Unlike Europe, “[e]xcept for national banking and the securities 
sector, there has been little attempt [by the United States] to ‘feder-
alize’ . . . fields or to harmonize the diverse state systems. In con-
trast, the European Community has extensively harmonized Member 
State legislation in these areas.”73 
Consequently, in its historical, and especially present, experience 
with harmonization, the European Union provides the template for 
reconciling the implementation of MDPs with the powers of states 
 
 71. Bower, supra note 1, at 187 (emphasis added). 
 72. See Townsend, supra note 66, at 16–17. 
 73. GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
LAW 545 (1993). 
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to resist such implementation. Lessons learned from the old ap-
proach show the United States what pitfalls to avoid, and the prom-
ise of the new approach gives confidence in a path that may be fol-
lowed to resolve the MDP issue worldwide. 
1. Historically: The old approach to harmonization 
Historically, the European Union relied upon what is now 
termed the “old approach” to harmonize individual state rules with 
the demands of the common Union.74 Illustrative of this approach is 
“the removal of obstacles to economic activity . . . through the adop-
tion of detailed harmonisation measures. In every area where na-
tional legislation served an accepted interest and thereby restricted 
trade between Member States, it was thought necessary for this in-
terest to be protected in the same way in every Member State.”75 
The old approach, especially when applied to the harmonization 
of professions, demanded such an extensive reconciliation of national 
and Union regulations, that “such measures were . . . agreed, if at all, 
only after years of negotiation.”76 Under the old approach, “[e]ven 
where agreement was reached, the resulting measures might not be 
geared to potential technological developments and might even be 
capable of obstructing them.”77 
The majority of United States bar associations seem to demand 
an analogue of the “old approach” applied to the multidisciplinary 
practice of law. States are not willing to harmonize their own juris-
dictional regulations with the recommendation of the ABA Commis-
sion until the details of every concern are explored and resolved.78 In 
the United States, the extent of detail demanded to be harmonized 
has slowed the process and may even deter MDPs altogether.79 In-




 74. See ANDREW EVANS, A TEXTBOOK ON EU LAW 474–75 (1998). 
 75. Id. at 474. 
 76. Id. at 475. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See supra Part II.B. 
 79. See supra Part II.A. 
 80. See Townsend, supra note 66, at 17 (“It is widely believed that the [ABA] House of 
Delegates will not vote in favour because the state bars, particularly the influential New York 
bar, are against MDPs.”). 
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As technology brings our world closer together in an interna-
tional marketplace with one-stop shopping and sophisticated con-
sumerism, the old approach is not only “capable of obstructing”81 
the creation of MDPs but also of postponing resolution of an issue 
that needs to be decided quickly. 
2. Presently: The new approach to harmonization 
Fortunately, the European Union has improved its approach to 
harmonization and now offers, in what has been termed the “new 
approach,” a template with which MDPs may be implemented with-
out severely threatening the sovereign powers of the regulators of 
the legal profession. “This approach is characterised by a willingness 
to allow certain derogations from harmonisation measures and a reli-
ance on outline legislation and mutual recognition.”82 
The new approach is particularly useful in resolving the conflicts 
surrounding MDPs, because under the new approach “[d]irectives 
may be couched in general terms, and detailed implementation may 
be left to others.”83 Such an approach is often called “outline legisla-
tion” and is supported by the European Community Treaty, Article 
189(3), where “directives lay down objectives to be achieved by the 
Member States, while leaving the latter free, in principle, to choose 
the means of implementation.”84 
Addressing MDPs with an objective, rather than detail-oriented, 
approach gives MDP antagonists the opportunity to chart their own 
solutions with a framework of the protagonist’s policy. This type of 
harmonization turns the MDP conflict into a win-win situation and 
leaves the ground fertile for the growth of solutions. 
It is significant to note that the new approach evolved out of the 
“need to enable Union industry to have a chance of competing with 
the United States, Japan [etc.].”85 In the context of multidisciplinary 
practice, the same need exists today: lawyers must have the shackles 




 81. EVANS, supra note 74, at 475. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 476. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 475. 
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The criticisms of the new approach are fairly confined but should 
be addressed here. Some have suggested that the new approach 
“fail[s] to have sufficient regard to requirements other than those of 
trade liberalisation.”86 However, as discussed below, new approach 
harmonization will not usurp the power of regulators of the legal 
profession to protect consumer, safety, ethical, and other interests.87 
The final parts of this Comment expand upon the principles of 
harmonization mentioned above, applying new approach harmoniza-
tion directly to the problems inherent in the multidisciplinary prac-
tice of law. 
IV. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? OBJECTIVES AND 
HARMONIZATION 
Because new approach harmonization requires objectives, a few 
words should be devoted to understanding the problem before an 
objective and tentative solution are proposed. 
A. Understanding the Challenges 
The MDP debate is complicated and involved. The controversy 
involves MDP adversaries not wanting to yield regulatory power and 
MDP advocates pointing to a myriad of circumstances suggesting 
that the time for MDPs has come. However, the challenges on either 
side of the debate, outlined below, can be harmonized. 
1. Challenges: MDP antagonists 
Although the challenges to the multidisciplinary practice of law 
cannot be uniformly prioritized, due to the variance in the commen-
tary, the reasons to prohibit MDPs include at least the following 
text. Because “[t]he primary purpose in regulating the legal profes-
sion is to protect the public interest,”88 many worry about the ability 
of MDPs to protect the public interest. Also, many “believe [that] 
MDPs are properly banned by Rule 5.4 and are inherently dangerous 
to client and public interests due to potential conflicts of interest and 
compromise of client privilege.”89 The ABA Commission’s Report 
 
 86. Id. at 477. 
 87. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 88. Dzienkowski, supra note 44, at 300. 
 89. Bower, supra note 1, at 187. 
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states that, “[t]he most frequently raised concern before the Com-
mission relating to the protection of professional independence of 
judgment involved nonlawyer supervision of lawyers.”90 Additionally, 
the following challenges highlight the many concerns heard by the 
Commission: 
• Confidentiality. “Concerns were expressed about the 
possible inappropriate disclosure of confidential client in-
formation within an MDP, since there is not uniformity 
among different professions about the circumstances un-
der which client information may, must, or must not be 
disclosed to a third party.”91 
• Attorney-client privilege. “The concern for the poten-
tial impairment of the attorney-client privilege arises from 
the possibility that a client of an MDP would not be 
properly informed as to the separate functions performed 
by the MDP and that the members or employees of the 
MDP would not treat legal matters in a manner appro-
priate to the preservation of the privilege.”92 
• Conflicts of interest. “The concern about conflicts of 
interest arises from differences between the rules of law-
yer conduct related to the lawyer’s obligation of loyalty 
to the client and the ethics rules of other professions.”93 
• Holding out as a lawyer. “[P]rotections offered to a cli-
ent by a lawyer can be lost if appropriate care is not paid 
to the manner in which the lawyer is identified to the cli-
ent and the manner in which the lawyer forms and main-
tains the client-lawyer relationship.”94 
• Pro bono service. Many fear that lawyers in an MDP will 
shirk their responsibility to provide “legal services to per-
sons of limited means or to charitable, religious, civic, 
community, governmental and educational organizations 
in matters that are designed primarily to address the legal 
needs of persons of limited means.”95 
 
 90. American Bar Association Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, supra note 48, 
at 193. 
 91. Id. at 194. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 195. 
 95. Id. 
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• Legal fees and client trust accounts. “Lawyers in an 
MDP may not have the same direct supervision over the 
handling of funds that they do in a law firm. Moreover, 
whereas fees paid by clients to law firms are by definition 
legal fees, fees paid by clients to MDPs will often cover 
both legal and nonlegal services.”96 
2. Challenges: MDP advocates 
Although the MDP advocates do not assert any challenges to 
MDPs, at least in the literal sense, there are several points of urgency 
that must be reconciled with the adversarial side of the debates.97 For 
instance, if MDPs are not universally accepted, the advocates express 
concerns about the future economic viability and competitiveness of 
the legal profession. “[C]onsumers in the marketplace are demand-
ing changes to the methods in which professional services are offered 
and delivered, and . . . consumers expect lawyers and other profes-
sionals to meet these changes.”98 Furthermore, advocates suggest 
“that Rule 5.4 in this instance is being used for the economic protec-
tion of independent, private law firms, and is not necessary for the 
protection of client and public interests, which it is agreed by both 
groups is the only justifiable basis for regulation.”99 
MDP advocates, in harmony with the Commission’s findings, 
believe that the adversarial challenges can be easily overcome. None-
theless, in the face of so many conflicting voices, resolution seems 
distant at best and non-existent at worst. Under new approach har-
monization, however, the challenges detailed above can be recon-
ciled. 
B. The Solution: New Approach Harmonization 
Under the template set forth by new approach harmonization, 
there are several levels at which the MDP issue can be resolved in a 
way that is mutually beneficial to both the advocates and adversaries 
of the multidisciplinary practice of law. None of these methods are 
mutually exclusive; in fact, a mixed approach may be the most effec-
tive. In general terms, the first method is the most faithful to how 
 
 96. Id. at 195–96. 
 97. See discussion supra Part II.A.2. 
 98. Dzienkowski, supra note 44, at 298. 
 99. Bower, supra note 1, at 187. 
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new approach harmonization has occurred in Europe. The second 
method, realizing that the United States lacks many aspects of the 
European setting that facilitate new approach harmonization, 
broadly interprets Europe’s experience to synthesize a workable 
compromise—the end result of which is new approach harmoniza-
tion in hybrid form. The final method, well suited to use in conjunc-
tion with the first two, calls upon the judicial system to facilitate 
workable MDP solutions as opportunities are presented. 
Regardless of the method employed to accomplish harmoniza-
tion, an objective that does not allow at least a minimum level of 
multidisciplinary practice will leave the parties at an impasse. 
Whether one believes the evidence suggesting that fully-integrated 
MDPs are appropriate, refusal to permit any level of MDP leaves 
both parties with nothing to gain and much to lose. Accordingly, the 
objective under any method of harmonization should be MDP-
friendly yet need not embrace the concept fully—leaving such a deci-
sion to the discretion of the state. 
1. First method: National mandates and strict adherence to new 
approach harmonization 
To be true new approach harmonization, there must be a man-
date analogous to a treaty provision or national mandate. Such trea-
ties and mandates have traditionally acted as the objectives around 
which individual states (or nations in the case of the European 
Community) harmonize their domestic laws. In Europe, these man-
dates have traditionally been broad—allowing for states/nations to 
maintain much of their individuality while mandating their compli-
ance with community objectives. For example, “Union legislation 
accepts that differences exist between Member States in professional 
training courses. However, the final qualifications giving access to 
similar fields of activity are in practice broadly comparable.”100 
a. Commerce clause: A possible focal point for harmonization. Be-
cause a treaty regime similar to that used by the European Commu-
nity is largely absent in the United States, an analogous and success-
ful MDP objective in the United States would require a federal 
statute or regulation. One commentator remarked, “If we do not 
 
 100. EVANS, supra note 74, at 477 (“[D]irectives on the mutual recognition of profes-
sional qualifications . . . resort as little as possible to the prescription of detailed training re-
quirements.”). 
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construct a system that moves us toward national bar admission and 
national regulation . . . we will find one day that, like the dinosaurs, 
we have become extinct.”101 Such an objective would not be without 
foundation and is entirely feasible under the Commerce Clause. Be-
cause states limit the economic activity of legal services providers, 
“[t]he interstate commerce clause . . . [is] a possible override to 
eliminate state barriers.”102 In short, because the legal profession is 
an important dynamic in interstate commerce, the federal govern-
ment, under the power of the Commerce Clause, could form an ob-
jective that would mandate a minimal acceptance of MDPs. This 
would open the door to increased economic activity by the legal pro-
fession as it expands its role to meet the demands of consumers and 
changes in the international market. However, as in Europe, the in-
dividual states would be left with broad authority to prescribe the 
technical specifications of multidisciplinary practice in that state. 
b. Structuring a range of harmonization. Europe’s experience 
with MDPs creates the template for defining the “range” of state in-
dividuality under the objective. The United Kingdom has proposed 
to structure the low, or more regulated, end of the range by 
“[r]ecognising that full MDPs require legislation and time to imple-
ment, the council plans two interim solutions . . . a ‘legal practice 
plus’ and a ‘linked partnership.’ The former would not allow full-
fledged one-stop-shops, but would enable law firms to have a minor-
ity of non-solicitor partners.”103 The latter “is based on the alliances 
many big accountancy firms already have with law firms, although 
the working party is to explore whether the ban on fees-sharing 
could be relaxed entirely or only in specified alliances.”104 At the 
other end of the range, the less regulated end, “working parties” or 
the regulators of the legal profession may choose to encourage open 
competition under the full multidisciplinary practice of law. 
This framework approach is in perfect harmony with the Com-
mission’s work. Indeed, “the Commission has outlined . . . five pos-
sible approaches, which range from ad hoc teaming between separate 
 
 101. Anthony E. Davis, The Drift to Multidisciplinary Practice, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 2, 1998, 
at 3, 6. 
 102. American Bar Association Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Oral Testimony 
of Stefan F. Tucker (visited Oct. 31, 2000) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/tucker4.html>. 
 103. Lucy Hickman, LawSoc Votes for MDPs After 10-Year Wait, THE LAW., Oct. 18, 
1999, at 2. 
 104. Id. 
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firms of professionals for client specific projects to fully integrated 
multidisciplinary firms.”105 Because of the Commission’s work, and 
the abundance of scholarship in this area, states are not left without 
resources to aid in defining how they will individually approach 
MDPs under a national objective. 
Although forming a national objective requiring base-level accep-
tance of MDPs may seem novel and unlikely, the power to do so is 
found in the Commerce Clause.106 This Comment encourages fed-
eral legislators to form a national objective, allowing providers of le-
gal services to be more competitive and the consumers of legal ser-
vices to enjoy greater economic freedom and choice, while 
preserving state sovereignty to regulate and define the extent of 
MDP allowed in each jurisdiction. 
2. Second method: An analogue of new approach harmonization and 
relying on persuasion and voluntary participation 
The fact that the United States lacks a national mandate allowing 
a base level of multidisciplinary practice and that legislation to create 
such a mandate will not likely be passed soon is not fatal to harmoni-
zation and resolution of the MDP debate. States need not wait for 
“formal” new approach harmonization to take place under a man-
date from Congress that may or may not be forthcoming. Based on a 
desire to preserve state regulatory power in this issue, state bars 
should voluntarily pick a point on the MDP “range” or adopt one of 
the models proposed by the Commission.107 
In this regard, the ABA could have done much to encourage this 
second method by outlining a “range” of suggested MDP activity.108 
Although the ABA’s rejection of MDPs may be interpreted as a voice 
defining the most constrictive end of the MDP range, it is more 
likely that the ABA’s recommendation does little more than affirm an 
anti-MDP status quo and is well off the range of MDP alternatives. 
Fortunately, the ABA left more to work with than an anti-MDP rec-
ommendation. Although the ABA’s Commission on Multidiscipli-
 
 105. Dzienkowski, supra note 44, at 298. This article also contains a discussion and 
analysis of the range and select models set forth by the Commission. See id. 
 106. See supra Part IV.B.1.a. 
 107. See supra text accompanying notes 104–06. 
 108. The author does wish to recognize the immense contribution of the American Bar 
Association through its appointed MDP Commission. 
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nary Practice was dissolved, the Commission’s work remains an im-
portant resource for states to formulate their position on their pre-
ferred “range” of MDP activity. 
In accordance with the Commission’s work, the better solution 
would have been for the ABA to consider that there need not be a 
hard-line stance on this issue. To resume a leadership role in this 
area, the ABA should reconsider its recommendation against MDPs 
and speak nationally for a “range” of solutions. For example, on the 
conservative end of the range, the ABA could recognize those who 
would ban “fee-sharing arrangements, investment in law practices by 
nonlawyers, nonlawyer ownership interests in law firms, and the in-
clusion of the names of nonlawyers . . . in a law firm name.”109 On 
the more permissive end of the spectrum, the ABA could follow the 
Commission’s July 1999 recommendation and “allow MDPs and 
fee-splitting between lawyers and nonlawyers, provided that ‘lawyers 
have the control and authority necessary to assure lawyer independ-
ence in the rendering of legal services.’”110 
Within such a range, states, most likely through their state bar as-
sociations, can engage in a process that is at the heart of our nation: 
individual state experimentation encouraged by national objectives 
and goals. Indeed, encouragement for states to experiment and en-
gage in various levels of the multidisciplinary practice of law will lead 
to solutions and may even lead to a uniform approach to the MDP 
issue.111 
Recognizing that there are proposals that would take the power 
to determine the MDP issue entirely from the states should motivate 
active and creative state participation.112 Further motivation may be 
found in evidence suggesting that failure to do something will ulti-
mately work to the detriment of lawyers wanting to compete in to-
day’s international market, where consumers are demanding, and 
finding in other places, one-stop shopping. 
 
 109. Geanne Rosenberg, In 11th-Hour Move, MDP Issue Is Back on ABA’s Summer Sched-
ule, NAT’L L.J., June 19, 2000, at B9. 
 110. Id. (quoting the ABA Commission’s Proposal). 
 111. An example from the last decade is how the individual states have approached the 
welfare question. As various states have experimented with a broad variety of welfare policies, 
certain states are emerging winners and, as such, are examples for others to follow. 
 112. See generally Tucker, supra note 43, at 286. Tucker notes, “Such regulation should 
be nationally based and Federally implemented, without the ability for state-to-state variance.” 
Id. 
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Although such action would not qualify as “formal” new ap-
proach harmonization where individual states rally around a national 
objective, the objective under this analogous approach would be the 
desire of a state to chart its own destiny within the MDP debate. 
But, because there are a myriad of concerns, many of which have 
yet to be articulated, this informal new approach is attractive because 
it leaves power with the regulating entities to address such issues as 
they arise—some of which may be specific to a particular jurisdiction. 
3. Third method: Court involvement 
Regardless of which method states use to further their regulatory 
authority, there is another player to consider in this debate. The ju-
dicial system can do much to initialize, guide, and set a substantive 
foundation for harmonization. 
In Europe, the European Court of Justice ensures that the MDP 
issue is decided in harmony with treaty and Community principles.113 
Similarly, domestic courts are in the position to become the impetus 
in harmonizing conflicts surrounding MDPs and ensuring that the 
debate is rooted in Constitutional principles. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has looked favorably upon state control 
over bar admission, but has yet to respond to a challenge based 
upon the Commerce Clause of article I, section 8 of the U.S. Con-
stitution. Short of federal legislation, such a challenge may be the 
best mechanism for accomplishing meaningful substantive change. 
The pertinent test was announced in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.: 
state regulation will be upheld where effects on interstate com-
merce are incidental “unless the burden imposed on such com-
merce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local bene-
fits.”114 
The courts can help the players of the MDP controversy deter-
mine which challenges are truly substantive. For example, using the 
interstate bar admission debate as an analogy to the MDP debate, 
the New Hampshire v. Piper court offers some guidance that could 
be extended to the issue at hand. 
 
 
 113. See supra text accompanying note 70. 
 114. Eric Williams, A National Bar—Carpe Diem, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 201, 206 
(1996) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)). 
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There is no evidence to support appellant’s claim that nonresidents 
might be less likely to keep abreast of local rules and procedures. 
Nor may we assume that a nonresident lawyer—any more than a 
resident—would disserve his clients by failing to familiarize himself 
with the rules . . . . 
[T]here is no reason to believe that a nonresident lawyer will con-
duct his practice in a dishonest manner. The nonresident lawyer’s 
professional duty and interest in his reputation should provide the 
same incentive to maintain high ethical standards as they do for 
resident lawyers. A lawyer will be concerned with his reputation in 
any community where he practices, regardless of where he may live. 
Furthermore, a nonresident lawyer may be disciplined for unethical 
conduct.115 
The courts can engage in a similar analysis in determining whether 
restrictions on MDPs are excessive in relation to the putative local 
benefits. “[A] second test [under the Commerce Clause] applies 
when the state regulation is discriminatory, either facially or in prac-
tical effect . . . . [and] requires that the discrimination be justified by 
reasons unrelated to economic protectionism.”116 
Before and during harmonization, courts can resolve MDP dis-
putes using the aforementioned tests—providing objective guidelines 
for states to determine how to regulate MDPs. The evidence dis-
cussed in this Comment suggests that the benefits of regulating 
MDPs so as to totally prohibit them are being outweighed by sophis-
ticated consumerism, market trends, and the fact that concerns about 
MDPs can be mitigated by solutions worked out by the Commission 
and others. But, without judicial participation, there may be insuffi-
cient motivation from Congress and individual states to form and act 
under pro-MDP objectives. 
C. Building the Bridge to Solutions 
Figuratively speaking, without harmonization, parties interested 
in the MDP issue stand at the edge of a chasm without a bridge to 
carry them to the other side where solutions and reconciliation await. 
Whether under formal “new approach,” voluntary state action, or 
 
 115. Supreme Court v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 285–86 (1985). 
 116. Scariano v. Justices of the Supreme Court, 38 F.3d 920, 926 (7th Cir. 1994) (cita-
tions omitted). 
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court intervention, harmonization is critical before solutions can be 
tooled. In this sense, harmonization will serve as the bridge upon 
which conflicting parties may cross to begin reconciling their con-
cerns. Fortunately, much has already been done on the other side of 
the bridge. Returning to the concerns of MDP adversaries discussed 
in Part IV.A.1, extensive efforts have been made by the Commission 
and others to address each point. The following examples are high-
lights of the types of measures that can be taken to reconcile con-
cerns about MDPs once the bridge of harmonization is crossed. 
• Professional Independence of Judgment. “[T]he 
Commission recommends that the . . . Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct clearly state that a lawyer who is 
supervised by a nonlawyer may not use as a defense to a 
violation of the rules of professional conduct the fact that 
the lawyer acted in accordance with the nonlawyer’s reso-
lution of a question of professional duty.”117 
• Confidentiality. “The Commission recommends that no 
change be made to the lawyer’s obligation to protect 
confidential client information. [Since] a nonlawyer in an 
MDP may be subject to an obligation of disclosure that is 
inconsistent with the lawyer’s obligation of confidential-
ity . . . , the Commission specifically recommends several 
safeguards to assure that a nonlawyer who works with, or 
assists, a lawyer in the delivery of legal services will act in 
a manner consistent with the lawyer’s professional obliga-
tions.”118 
• Attorney-client privilege. “[T]he Commission recom-
mends amendments to the ABA Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct that would clarify a lawyer’s position 
within the MDP, the lawyer’s relationship with the 
MDP’s clients and the obligations of an MDP to protect 
client and public interests.”119 
• Conflicts of interest. “The Commission recommends 
that in connection with its delivery of legal services, an 
MDP be governed by the same rules of professional con-
 
 117. American Bar Association Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, supra note 48, 
at 193. 
 118. Id. at 194. 
 119. Id. 
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duct as a law firm with regard to the imputation of con-
flicts and permissible screening measures.”120 
• Holding out as a lawyer. “[T]he Commission empha-
sizes the need for lawyers to fully disclose to clients their 
status. Lawyers in an MDP who hold themselves out, or 
who are held out, as providing services, which, if pro-
vided by a lawyer otherwise engaged in the practice of 
law, would be regarded as part of such practice of law for 
purposes of application of the rules of professional con-
duct, must adhere to all the professional conduct 
rules.”121 
• Pro bono service. “Lawyers in an MDP should fulfill 
[the pro bono service] responsibility in the same way”122 
as those in traditional practices. 
• Legal fees and client trust accounts. “MDP[s] must 
also comply with any and all financial recordkeeping rules 
of the jurisdiction in which the legal services are being 
delivered.”123 
The above list is neither comprehensive nor exhaustive. Un-
doubtedly many MDP issues have yet to be resolved. The advantage 
of harmonization is that under a pro-MDP objective states will con-
tinue to be the leaders in ensuring that the above measures, and oth-
ers yet to be determined, are executed and modified to guard against 
MDP abuses within that jurisdiction.124 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 195. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 196. 
 124. The Commission also suggests the following: 
As a condition of permitting a lawyer to engage in the practice of law in an MDP, 
the MDP should be required to give to the highest court with the authority to regu-
late the legal profession in each jurisdiction in which the MDP is engaged in the de-
livery of legal services a written undertaking, signed by the chief executive officer (or 
similar official) and the board of directors (or similar body) that: 
(A) it will not directly or indirectly interfere with a lawyer’s exercise of independent 
professional judgment on behalf of a client; 
(B) it will establish, maintain and enforce procedures designed to protect a lawyer’s 
exercise of independent professional judgment on behalf of a client from interfer-
ence by the MDP, any member of the MDP, or any person or entity controlled with 
the MDP; 
(C) it will establish, maintain and enforce procedures to protect a lawyer’s profes-
sional obligation to segregate client funds. 
(D) the members of the MDP delivering or assisting in the delivery of legal services 
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Nonetheless, states will only maintain the power to regulate 
should they be willing to act under a pro-MDP objective, such as 
demanded by today’s consumers and the dynamics of the interna-
tional market. If states fail to relax their regulations barring MDPs, 
they may lose the power to effectively regulate. “If we [state regula-
tors] do not ourselves take the steps to redefine . . . how we—and 
our activities—are to be regulated, others in the new global economy 
will do it for us.”125 
V. CONCLUSION 
The research of the Commission and experience of Europe and 
other countries show that Model Rule 5.4 is primarily prophylactic 
and is not necessary to maintain ethical conduct in MDPs. Indeed, 
the evidence should persuade the courts to find such regulations in-
consistent with the two tests under the Commerce Clause.126 
“[T]here are surely better ways of protecting professional independ-
ence than by restricting the development of forms of multi-
disciplinary practice that promise many benefits in innovative and 
 
will abide by the rules of professional conduct; 
(E) it will respect the unique role of the lawyer in society as an officer of the legal 
system, a representative of clients and a public citizen having special responsibility 
for the administration of justice. This undertaking should acknowledge that lawyers 
in an MDP have the same special obligation to render voluntary pro bono publico 
legal service as lawyers practicing solo or in law firms; 
(F) it will annually review the procedures established in subsection (B) and amend 
them as needed to ensure their effectiveness; and annually certify its compliance with 
subsections (A)-(F) and provide each lawyer in the MDP a copy of the certification; 
(G) it will annually file a signed and verified copy of the certificate described in sub-
section (F) with the highest court with the authority to regulate the legal profession 
in each jurisdiction in which the MDP is engaged in the delivery of legal services, 
along with relevant information about each lawyer who is a member of the MDP. 
(H) it will permit the highest court with the authority to regulate the professional 
conduct of lawyers in each jurisdiction in which the MDP is engaged in the delivery 
of legal services to review and conduct an administrative audit of the MDP, as each 
such authority deems appropriate, to determine and assure compliance with subsec-
tions (A)-(G); and 
(I) it will bear the cost of the administrative audit of MDPs described in subpara-
graph (H) through the payment of an annual certification fee. 
American Bar Association Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Appendix C: Reporter’s 
Notes, n.62 (visited Oct. 31, 2000) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpappendixc.html>. 
 125. Davis, supra note 16, at 230 (illustrating the importance of acting in unison under a 
common objective). 
 126. See supra Part IV.B.3. 
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cost-effective services to clients and consumers.”127 This Comment 
encourages regulating authorities to exercise their regulatory power 
and find those ways. Tenable means do exist to protect the players in 
the legal services field while allowing the multidisciplinary practice of 
law. 
An objective generated under new approach harmonization and 
supported by the varying models of commitment to MDP suggested 
by the ABA Commission can keep regulators from aimlessly 
postponing the issue, while leaving them in control of choosing 
alternatives. “[C]linging to old rallying cries, like the suggestion that 
our commitment to client protection makes us different, and will 
enable us to hold back the tide, simply ignores both the coming 
realities and the existing pressures for change.”128 
Under this proposal, some may argue that the role of regulating 
authorities is so reduced that it becomes trivial. However, this is not 
supported by Europe’s general experience where the authorities play 
a critical role in that it is “incumbent upon the competent public au-
thorities—including legally recognized professional bodies—to en-
sure that . . . practice . . . is applied in accordance with the objective 
defined . . . relating to the freedom of establishment.”129 
Although the acceptance of MDPs is necessary for the many rea-
sons discussed above, it is not an imperative without advantages. 
Professor John Dzienowski emphasizes the following advantages: 
The major benefit of MDP services is the delivery of an integrated 
team approach to serving client interests . . . . The second major 
benefit of MDP services is the efficiency that translates into savings 
of time or money, and results in a higher quality product . . . . 
Third, an MDP is more likely to identify both legal and non-legal 
issues and problems by lawyers and non-lawyers.130 
Regulators of the legal profession should recognize that the 
MDP issue need not be an all-or-nothing proposition. Even regula-
tors choosing the most pro-MDP end of the range can effectively 
maintain the authority to preserve the ethical values unique to law-
 
 127. Robert W. Gordon, Letter to ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, May 
21, 1999, 1999 A.B.A. SEC. L. PRAC. MGMT. ANN. MEETING 288, 296. 
 128. Davis, supra note 16, at 230. 
 129. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 73, at 592 (quoting Thieffry v. Conseil de l’Ordre des 
Avocats a la Cour de Paris, 1977 E.C.R. 765). 
 130. Dzienkowski, supra note 44, at 313–14. 
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yers. Indeed, it is the experience of some that “the fully integrated 
multidisciplinary firm, is optimal . . . [and] could be regulated so 
that the core values of the legal profession would not be endan-
gered.”131 
In varying degrees, the ABA, state bar associations, Congress, 
and the judiciary, should work under new approach harmonization 
to form an objective that encourages a workable framework of op-
tions that will allow MDPs. States should not seek the detailed har-
monization of the old approach but should exercise their independ-
ence and create efficient ways to follow a pro-MDP objective. 
Through harmonization, the advocates and adversaries of MDPs can 
reach a mutually beneficial solution. Regulating authorities will pre-
serve their power to keep a vigilant eye on the evolution of the mul-
tidisciplinary practice of law. Providers of legal services will be free to 
respond to the competitive nature of today’s market, and consumers 
of legal services will be able to obtain services better tailored and 
priced to fit their needs. Although the process requires compromise 
and change, it is important to remember that acceptance of multidis-
ciplinary practices is “not revolutionary; it is evolutionary.”132 
Robert K. Christensen 
 
 
 131. Id. at 299; see also Neff, supra note 28, at 22 (noting that “MDPs can be imple-
mented while protecting consumers from unscrupulous professionals”). 
 132. Tucker, supra note 43, at 286. 
